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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents an alternative interpretation of an experimental public goods game dataset, 
particularly on the understanding of the observed antisocial behaviour phenomenon between subjects 
of a public goods experiment in different cities around the world. The anonymous nature of 
contributions and punishments in this experiment are taken into account to interpret results. This is 
done by analysing dynamic behaviour in terms of mean contributions across societies and their 
association with antisocial punishment. By taking into account the heterogeneity between the cities 
in which the public goods experiment has been performed, this analysis shows a contrasting 
interpretation. Instead of one trend across cities, two opposite trends are seen across different cities. 
In addition, we find that the presence of these trends to have an impact on the role antisocial and 
prosocial behaviour in public goods games. When accounting for these trends, the antisocial and 
prosocial behaviour is found to have a significant role in Western societies. 
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The behavioural and experimental economics literature has been steadily providing new insights on 
the phenomenon of punishment assigned to freeloaders and also to cooperators in public goods 
experiments. Hermann et al (2008a), for example, discuss an experimental setup allowing two types 
of treatment: with and without punishment amongst individuals. The main argument in the 
aforementioned reference is that “comparable social groups from complex developed societies with 
the widest possible range of cultural and economic backgrounds” present similar tendencies of 
antisocial punishment. The paper’s accompanying dataset is comprised of 16 different cities across 
the world where the experiment took place; each presenting a level of punishment towards those who 
behave pro-socially (i.e. individual investment in the public good).  
 
Two types of punishment can be found in the experimental dataset: anti-social and pro-social. The 
former is defined as “… the sanctioning of people who behave prosocially." Hermann et al (2008a), 
hence the latter can be defined as the sanctioning of people who behave antisocially (i.e. punishing 
those who did not contribute as much as oneself to the public goods pool in an experiment round). 
Punishment as such is so interpreted as an important mechanism to encourage pro-social behaviour. 
 
Although Hermann et al (2008a) aimed to study antisocial punishment behaviour across different 
cities, it is unclear how such heterogeneity has been accounted for and harnessed in the experiment. 
This is as the experimental method implicitly assumed every society would be comparable (i.e. 
homogenous) in terms of societal characteristics including social, economic and political background. 
Indeed, Hermann et al (2008b)2 reports country-level indicators for societies including aspects such 
as social capital, economic prosperity, law enforcement and democracy, cultural dimensions and 
value orientations. Yet the wide differences across these cities are apparent and these group and 
individual-level characteristics have not been accounted for. 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide an alternative interpretation of the antisocial punishment 
phenomenon in light of the public goods game experiments conducted by Hermann et al (2008a). 
This goal is achieved by explicitly accounting for heterogeneity across cities and identifying clusters 
of those with similar antisocial behaviour, which form homogenous clusters (or blocks). This 
approach allows the investigation as to whether the relationship between antisocial punishment and 
                                                          
2 See Table S1, page 6. 
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mean contributions, as described in the original paper, holds for every different cluster in the dataset, 
or if it is a specific feature of certain groups of cities. The paper is organised as follows. Section two 
discusses the experimental public goods game setup and the analysis of the resulting experimental 
data. After that, the econometric model and empirical approach is introduced and discussed in detail. 
Findings are discussed in section 3 and section 4 concludes the paper.  
2. Experimental setup and analysed data 
According to the subject pool details section in Hermann et al (2008b), the 1120 voluntary subjects 
were recruited according to which university the authors could have access to recruit students to 
participate in the computer-based experiment. The criteria involved in aiming for a group that is “… 
as homogeneous as possible across subject pools with respect to their socio-economic background.” 
while trying “… to maximize the likelihood that subjects were strangers to one another” (Hermann 
et al, 2008b, 10). This was further checked by eliciting “… socio-economic background information 
in a post-experimental questionnaire”, which contained questions about “… personal characteristics, 
family background, and social integration”. That is, what may influence cooperation or punishment. 
 
The experimental data associated with Hermann et al (2008a, 2008b) consists mainly of individual 
contributions and individual punishment levels, according to the public goods game experiments run 
with and without the possibility of punishment3. The setup consisted of a 10-round game administered 
in 16 different cities across the world, with varying number of participants per city. Individuals were 
anonymously assigned to groups of 4, with the aim of recording the numeric levels of observed 
cooperation and punishment among them. This was done using a zTree Fischbacher (2007) interface 
designed to collect data from participants regarding contributions and punishments using one desktop 
computer per recruited subject. Each participant received 20 tokens of which they needed to decide 
how many, per round, would be kept for themselves or otherwise invested in the public good. Each 
participant earned 0.4 tokens for each token invested, regardless of having contributed or not. 
Individual decisions were recorded independently and only the anonymised contributions of other 
group members could be seen after all participants having committed to a contribution amount. If 
punishments had been enabled in the experimental setup, each individual participant would also see 
the total amount of assigned punishments, but not who in their group has decided to do so. 
Punishments vary from 0 to 10 points, of which each does reduce the punished member’s earnings 
                                                          
3 Further information is available on Hermann et al (2008b). 
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by 3 tokens. Furthermore, the individual cost of punishing another group member was 1 token, per 
round in the corresponding experimental setup. 
 
 
2.1. The econometric model and statistical test 
For the purpose of this paper, we use mean contributions with and without punishment over the ten 
periods for all 16 cities. We begin by applying the approach proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007), PS 
hereafter. The approach proposes a simple econometric model, which can be used to cluster the 
individuals’ cross-sections in clubs4 of convergence. The econometric model can be defined as a 
nonlinear transition factor model as: 
            (1) 
with  is contribution in the i-th city over the t periods. The model contains a common factor  
and an idiosyncratic element , which measure the deviation of contribution of the i-th individual 
trend over period t from the common factor . The latter can be interpreted as a common steady state 
of contribution in the panel. If individuals in every studied city behave similarly, then their 
contribution over each of the experimental periods would converge to a common steady state. This 
assumption can be tested using the convergence concept introduced by PS. The statistical test is based 
on the individual’s contribution, which is measured by . This latter captures the individual 
contribution of the total as . 
 
The idiosyncratic element is defined as: 
         (2) 
where  fixed,  across individuals i = 1, 2, …, N and dependent over time t. Finally, 
 is a slowly varying function of time, in which  as .  
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Based on the formulation above, the null hypothesis of convergence is accepted if for all  if 
. 
The analysis of convergence and steady state equilibrium is based on studying the dynamic behaviour 
of a relative transition coefficient, , which measures and captures the divergent behaviour of 
individuals’ contribution from the steady state level of contribution  The relative transition 
coefficient is defined formally as: 
        
 (3) 
Using this parameter, along with the loading coefficient  , we assess the convergence. That is, 
namely, if , then , so that the cross-sectional variance of  converges to zero and the 
result is: 
 as          (4) 
The property shown in (A.4) is essential in testing the null hypothesis of convergence and to cluster 
individuals into convergence clubs. The coefficient , in addition to displaying the relative transition 
path for individual subjects in the experimental public goods panel data, measures and captures the 
divergent behaviour of individual subjects from what is the common stochastic trend or the long-run 
growth path . The procedure is implemented in two stages. The first stage is a test as to whether 
there is convergence. The second stage is a test as to whether there are different clubs of convergence. 
In the first stage, the null hypothesis of overall convergence5 is tested,  and , against 
the alternative hypothesis of no convergence,  for all i, or . In order to test this 
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hypothesis, a logt regression is used as proposed by PS, which is based on the cross-sectional variance 
ratio  where: 
          (5) 
The regression is defined as follows: 
        (6) 
where , with r>0, ,  and  is the estimated value of  in 
the null above. The regression is run starting at , which is the integer part of rT for some 
fraction r>0. PS recommends using r=0.3. Once the regression is run, the null is accepted if the 
autocorrelation heteroskedasticity robust one tail  statistic is above the critical value, c (e.g. at 5% 
level of significance, accept the null if ). 
If the null is rejected, this does not imply no convergence. It may in fact imply that relative 
convergence test should be performed; that is:  the test is then about whether there are different 
clusters of convergence. 
 
2.2 Clustering algorithm  
PS propose the following steps to perform the clustering procedure6:  
 
                                                          
6 GAUSS code for clustering algorithm is available online to download directly from Sul’s personal webpage: 
http://www.utdallas.edu/~dxs093000/papers/exm.pgm. R users may refer to Package ‘ConvergenceClubs’: https://cran.r-


































Step 1 (Last observation ordering): individual series in the panel are ordered in descending fashion 
according to the most recent observation. In practice, however, PS put forward a recommendation of 
ordering the series according to its average over the last fraction of the sample for . 
 
Step 2 (Core group formation):  this stage identifies the initial club of series, consisting of at least 
two series, with the highest average in the panel (as described in Step 1). This group forms a core 
group,  for , against which the remaining series is to be compared. A sequence of logt 
regression is run and the test statistic  is estimated for this subgroup to choose the core 
group size . The size  is determined according the following criterion: 
 subject to       (7) 
This criterion ensures that the null of convergence is maintained for each k. If the condition (7) does 
not hold for all sequential pairs involved in the testing procedure, then we conclude that there is no 
convergence subgroup; otherwise, we have found the core subgroup, which is denoted by . 
 
Step 3 (Sieve individuals for membership): in this step, we define whether there are other individuals 
to be added to the core subgroup defined in step 2 from the remaining individuals, which form the 
complementary subgroup . One individual from  is added one at a time to the core subgroup 
and the logt regression is implemented. If the t statistic estimated from this regression is above the 
critical value, then the individual chosen is to be added to the , otherwise it is dropped. This 
procedure is repeated on the remaining individuals and the first convergence club is constructed. 
Next, estimate the logt regression using the data in this first convergence club and confirm that 
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Step 4 (Stopping rule): in this step, the remaining individuals from step 3 are used to form a subgroup. 
The logt test is run and if  then the cluster convergence is formed. This implies there are 
two convergent clubs in the panel. Otherwise, steps 1-3 are repeated to search for smaller subgroups 
of convergent series according to the dataset. If the alternative hypothesis is accepted for all size of 
subgroups (i.e. no k in step 2 for which ), then we conclude that the remaining individuals 
are divergent.  
 
3. Discussion of findings 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the general trends of contributions with and without punishment and the 
statistical association between contribution and punishment, respectively. Figures 1A and 1B are 
replications of the Figures 2A and 3 in Hermann et al (2008a) and illustrate the mean contribution 
before and after punishment to the public good over the 10 periods. 
 
These graphs show that (i), in the experiment without punishment, individual contributions decline 
over the period in all cities and (ii), in the experiment with punishment, contributions tend to stabilise 
around the rather constant averages in every city recording higher contributions (i.e. conceptually 
grouped as Western societies) in comparison to contributions observed in other cities.  
Figure 2 shows a statistically significant negative correlation between mean contributions and mean 
antisocial punishments (-0.90 [p-value=0.00]7). This confirms the two observations above, as 
deduced from figures 1A and 1B. 
 
[Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
Although the aim of the graphs above is to compare the contribution across cities, these cannot be 
interpreted as a reflection of the typical behaviour of a society towards their contribution to the public 
goods, as the baseline is the average contribution across non-homogenous cities. In other words, the 
dynamic of contributions presented by these figures are not independently determined by each sample 
but rather by the aggregation effect caused by the sample selection bias in the form of omitting other 
cities in the analysis. This is illustrated in Figures 1C and 1D, where the concept of relative mean 
contribution is used.  
 
                                                          





Relative mean contribution takes into account the behaviour of mean contribution relative to cross 
sectional8 average of mean contribution. This latter act as a benchmark for comparison across various 
societies. This is in contrast of the original specification, which expresses contribution in absolute 
terms. That also does not account for the performance of a society in relation to the other members 
and ignores the panel nature of the data.  
 
In this context, Figure 1C shows a different pattern from its counterpart, Figure 1A. Namely that (i) 
contribution does not decline in every experimented society and that (ii) those cities found to be 
contributing less (including Athens, Dnipropetrovs’k, Istanbul, Minsk, Muscat, Riyadh and Samara) 
have contributed relatively more –particularly towards the end rounds of the public good experiment. 
Figure 1D shows a different dynamic, clustered in patterns, when compared to Figure 1B. The original 
depiction of contribution after punishment seems to start at lower levels, yet there is an increase of 
contributions before declining again. Hence the relative mean contribution concept depicts those 
contributions that start at higher levels before declining.  
 
The correlation coefficient and plot shown in Figure 2 is not strongly consistent across all cities. 
Various outlier cities are located far from the main cluster (these being Athens, Dnipropetrovs’k, 
Istanbul, Minsk, Muscat, Riyadh and Samara). Once the dataset is analysed separately according to 
these groups, one can see contrasting Spearman’s correlation coefficients. These values differ from 
the analysis where all cities are included and thus provide the insight that different behavioural 
patterns are clustered in two different groups in this experimental dataset. These are: -0.58 [p-
value=0.09] when excluding outliers and -0.36 [p-value=0.43] when outliers alone are considered.  
 
Table 19 reports clustering based on PS algorithm. In both cases, with and without punishment, 
contribution does not converge. There are four estimated clusters in the case of contribution without 
punishment, while two are estimated when punishment is allowed. Figures 3A and 3B illustrate these 
clusters. Contributions with and without punishment are not identical across cities once society-
specific characteristics are accounted for. This suggests reviewing the interpretation of a uniform 
association between mean contributions and antisocial punishments in this dataset. 
[Table 1and Figures 3A-3B about here] 
 
                                                          
8 This can also be interpreted as cross society mean contribution since the data has been collected in various societies. 
9 We also report bootstrap statistics in Appendix 1. The bootstrap based findings suggest that contribution with 
punishment within each club is divergent. This implies further investigation is required on the causes of this divergence. 
This require large data set, which unfortunately is not possible for us to obtain. Consequently, our results should be 
interpreted with caution. 
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Figures 4A and 4B illustrate the correlation between mean contribution in clusters 1 and 2 and 
corresponding punishment, respectively. The result is different and the association depends on the 
location of cities in either cluster 1 or 2. Figure 4A shows that mean contribution declines with higher 
punishment. This is evidence of antisocial punishment in cities located in cluster 1, which is consistent 
with Hermann et al (2008a) (spearman=-0.62 [p-value=0.05]). Nevertheless, the association is 
reversed when considering cities of the second cluster with positive correlation (spearman=0.64 [p-
value=0.05]), as illustrated in figure 4B. 
[Figures 4A-4B about here] 
Table 2 reports the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates of the relationship between the dependent 
variable (i.e. group average contributions in period 2 to 10) and the set of independent variables 
including: group average contributions in period 1, group average punishment of free riding and group 
average antisocial punishment. The purpose of this empirical exercise to confirm the extent to which 
the level of cooperation and punishment has on the overall performance of individual subjects in this 
public goods games experiment. It is within this context that the presence and effect of clubs of 
convergence is investigated. Column (1) in Table 2 replicates the original results by Hermann et al 
(2008), while Column (2) reports OLS estimates of the same empirical model but accounting for the 
clubs of contribution. According to Hermann et al (2008) findings, all independent variables are found 
to be statistically significant. While contribution in period 1 and free-riding punishment have a 
positive effect on the average contribution in periods 2 to 10, the antisocial punishment does 
substantially decrease the average contribution in periods 2 to 10.  
 
The argument in this paper is that the dynamics of punishment and contribution is not consistent 
across all cities and societies. As a result of this, the role of punishment and cooperation is distorted 
if all cities and groups are pooled in the same sample with the assumption of a homogeneous 
contribution trend across the dataset. Hence, different conclusions regarding the role of free-riding 
and antisocial punishment are obtained when accounting for differences in contribution across cities 
according to the clubs of convergence. Further to this, column 2 in Table 2 suggests that when 
accounting for heterogeneous behaviour of contribution and punishment, free-riding and antisocial 
punishment become both statistically significant in explaining the contribution dynamics in those 
cities belonging to Club 2 (Athens, Dnipropetrovs'k, Minsk, Muscat, Riyadh, Samara). Conversely, 
unlike Club 2, members of Club 1 (Bonn, Boston, Chengdu, Copenhagen, Istanbul, Melbourne, 
Nottingham, Seoul, St. Gallen, Zurich) are found to behave in the same way as originally reported in 
Hermann et al (2008).  
11 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, the extent in which the conclusions discussed in Hermann et al (2008) are investigated 
in terms of robustness when a different data analysis approach is deployed. We find the dynamics of 
contributions and its relationship with antisocial punishment being dependant on (i) the behaviour in 
each clustered group of experimented cities and (ii) the particular characteristics of each city. When 
simultaneously accounting for these, the antisocial punishment behaviour can be interpreted 
differently from the original discussion related to this experimental dataset. The experimental setup 
has no parallel with an actual public goods setup, so the results of analysing this dataset are limited 
regarding empirical insights (Weisberg (2004) and Guala and Salanti (2001)). This is as nowhere 
individuals pay for anonymous and direct punishments of other public good beneficiaries. Hence one 
cannot determine whether the original interpretation of the experimental dataset depends on the 
analytical methodology or on the experimental design assumptions (Levins, 1996).  
 
As such, this paper provides an alternative analysis with a different interpretation to the experimental 
data, bearing in mind the limitations of the experiment design for observing antisocial punishment in 
it. In the context of alternative interpretation, we account for differences in the dynamics of 
contribution and punishment in public good games across cities. Unlike the original interpretation by 
Hermann et al (2008), we relax the homogeneity assumption about the dynamics of contribution 
across cities. This resulted in different dynamic paths of contribution, which show that contribution 
and antisocial punishment does not behave uniformly across cities. The main implication of the 
presence of heterogeneous dynamics of contribution is the significant role of prosocial punishment 
and antisocial punishment. While the original work, by Hermann et al (2008), suggests that antisocial 
punishment is a prominent feature of contribution across cities, our results suggest that antisocial 
punishment does not exist in all cities and only affects certain cities. Antisocial punishment is found 
to have negative and significant role in cities in the first club (i.e. Bonn, Boston, Chengdu, 
Copenhagen, Istanbul, Melbourne, Nottingham, Seoul, St. Gallen, Zurich). Although antisocial 
punishment is found to have positive relationship with contribution (as in Figure 4D), this effect is 
found to be statistically insignificant when incorporating other factors and clubs (as in regression 
reported in Table 2) on contribution dynamics in the cities identified in the second club (i.e. Athens, 





















Figure 1: (A) Mean contribution before punishment: represents the average of the contribution in each round for each city. Punishment is not allowed. (B) Mean contribution after punishment. 
Represents the average of the contribution minus punishment in each round for each city. Panel B shows an improvement of contribution - in absolute terms – due to introducing punishment.  
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Figure 1: (C) Relative mean contribution before punishment. (D) Relative mean contribution after punishment 






Figure 2: Mean contribution against mean antisocial punishment (Spearman= -0.90 [0.00]). This figure reproduces the 












































Figure 3: (A) Relative mean contribution clustering before punishment. (B) Relative mean contribution clustering after punishment. 












































































































































































Cross sectional average of mean antisocial punishment
B
Figure 4: (A) The association between mean contribution and punishment in Cluster 1 (spearman=-0.62 [0.05]). (B) The 
association between mean contribution and punishment in Cluster 2 (spearman=0.66 [0.05]). These figures show that when 
accounting for the dynamic path of relative mean contribution, introducing punishment lead to different conclusions. Values 




Table 1: Clusters of contribution 
 Mean Contribution 




Cluster 1 -1.112 
[Dnipropetrovs'k, Muscat] 
4.572 
[Bonn, Boston, Chengdu, Copenhagen, Istanbul, 
Melbourne, Nottingham, Seoul, St. Gallen, 
Zurich] 
Cluster 2 2.667 
[Athens, Copenhagen, Minsk, 
Riyadh, Samara] 
-0.113 
[Athens, Dnipropetrovs'k, Minsk, Muscat, 
Riyadh, Samara ] 
Cluster 3 -1.505 
[Bonn, Seoul, Zurich] 
N.A. 
Cluster 4 -0.539 
[Boston, Chengdu, Istanbul, 
Melbourne, Nottingham, St. Gallen] 
N.A. 
Overall test: The null hypothesis states the convergence to the common steady state. All numbers reported are the estimated t 
statistics. The null cannot be rejected as long as estimated one tail t statistic is larger than the critical value  at 5% 
level of significance * indicates significance at 5% level, or the rejection of the null. The term ‘Cluster’ refers to the club of 
convergence within which a subset of cities’ contribution are convergent. In other words, each cluster represents a club-based 
steady state. If the overall test shows failure to reject the alternative hypothesis, the procedure moves to test the presence of 
clubs of convergence. Thus, the above output show failure to reject the null hypothesis and we conclude that there is club of 
convergence. 
Table 2: OLS Estimates of the determinants of Group Average Contribution in periods 2 to 10. 
Dependent variable: Group average contribution in periods 2 to 10 (1) (2) 
  Cluster 1 Cluster 2 






















 0.60 0.66 0.59 
F test 136.9 [0.0] 110.19 [0.0] 49.96 [0.0] 
N 273 168 105 
 refers to the adjusted R-squared. N: the sample size. The F test tests the null of the joint insignificance of the model 
against the alternative joint significance. Both models are jointly significant. Value in ( . ) and [ . ] are standard errors and p-
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Appendix 1: Clusters of contribution- Bootstrap Statistics 
 Mean Contribution 




Cluster 1 -0.43 
[Dnipropetrovs'k, Muscat] 
-3.64* 
[Bonn, Boston, Chengdu, Copenhagen, Istanbul, 
Melbourne, Nottingham, Seoul, St. Gallen, 
Zurich] 
Cluster 2 -1.66 
[Athens, Copenhagen, Minsk, 
Riyadh, Samara] 
-3.02* 
[Athens, Dnipropetrovs'k, Minsk, Muscat, 
Riyadh, Samara ] 
Cluster 3 -0.52 
[Bonn, Seoul, Zurich] 
N.A. 
Cluster 4 -1.14 
[Boston, Chengdu, Istanbul, 
Melbourne, Nottingham, St. Gallen] 
N.A. 
Overall test: The null hypothesis states the convergence to the common steady state. All numbers reported are the estimated t 
statistics. The null cannot be rejected as long as estimated one tail t statistic is larger than the critical value  at 5% 
level of significance * indicates significance at 5% level, or the rejection of the null. The bootstrap statistics are based on 





Appendix 2: Phillips and Sul approach codes (based on GAUSS)10 
new; 
cls; 
format /m1 /rd 8,6;  /*This determines the decimals and digits before 
the dot */ 
outwidth 240; 
 
n = ?;  /* The number of subjects*/ 
t = ?; /* The sample size */ 
load data[?,?] = ????; // type the data file name 
 
 
x = data;                 
 
iname ={"Name 1","Name 2","Name 3"}; //Define series names- you can 
extend the names to be consistent with n 
 
 
kq =?;        @ r-value: Usually set kq = int(rows(x)/3) @ 
 
output file = example1.out reset; output on; 






















/*Clubs of Convergence Test */ 
 
{in1,in2,in3} = sorthat(yh,crit,kq); 
{b1,t1} = logts(yh[.,in2],kq); 
" Sub Club Convergence ==================="; 
"        b-coef   t-stat"; 
format /m1 /rd 8,3; 
"const";;b1[2]~t1[2]; 
"logt ";;b1[1]~t1[1]; 
                                                          
10 The codes below are extracted and slightly modified from the original codes provided by Phillips and Sul 
(2017). The reader can refer to the link http://www.utdallas.edu/~dxs093000/papers/exm.pgm for detailed 




format /m1 /rd 8,0; 
" First convergence club";;in2;$iname[in2]'; 
@================================================@ 
{b1,t1} = logts(yh[.,in3],kq); 
" Check if the rest group forms the other convergent club"; 
"        b-coef   t-stat"; 
format /m1 /rd 8,3; 
"const";;b1[2]~t1[2]; 
"logt ";;b1[1]~t1[1]; 
format /m1 /rd 8,0; 
if t1[1] > -1.65; 
"Since t-stat > -1.65, the rest forms a convergent club ";  
in3;$iname[in3]'; 
goto final; endif; 
"Since t-stat < -1.65, repeat clustering procedures"; 
nine = in3; 
 
ic1 = 2; 
dasi: 
"========================================================="; 
restg = yh[.,nine]; 
yh2 = restg; 
{inn1,inn2,inn3} = sorthat(yh2,crit,kq); 
{b1,t1} = logts(yh[.,nine[inn2]],kq); 
 
ic1;;"converent club test"; 
"        b-coef   t-stat"; 
format /m1 /rd 8,3; 
"const";;b1[2]~t1[2]; 
"logt ";;b1[1]~t1[1]; 
format /m1 /rd 8,0; 
ic1;;"club";nine[inn2];$iname[nine[inn2]]'; 
 
{b1,t1} = logts(yh[.,nine[inn3]],kq); 
" Check if the rest group forms the other convergent club"; 
"        b-coef   t-stat"; 
format /m1 /rd 8,3; 
"const";;b1[2]~t1[2]; 
"logt ";;b1[1]~t1[1]; 
format /m1 /rd 8,0; 
if t1[1] > -1.65; 
"Since t-stat > -1.65, the rest forms a convergent club ";  
nine[inn3];$iname[nine[inn3]]'; 
goto final; endif; 
"Since t-stat < -1.65, repeat clustering procedures"; 












t = rows(yh); 
22 
 
{b1,t1} = logts(yh,kq); 
 
t = rows(yh); 
n = cols(yh); 
 kk = yh[t,.]'~seqa(1,1,n); 
 kk = rev(sortc(kk,1)); 
 kin = kk[.,2]'; 
 yhh = yh[.,kin];   
 tt1 = zeros(3,1); 
 
@ ========= finding initial ================ @ 
 ik1 = 1;  
dasi1: 
  ww = yhh[.,ik1:ik1+1]; 
  {b1,t1} = logts(ww,kq); 
if t1[1] < -1.65; ik1 = ik1 + 1; goto dasi1; endif; 
 
@================@; 
 tt1 = zeros(n,1); 
 bb1 = zeros(n,1); 
 
 i = ik1+1; 
 do while i <= 10; 
  ww = yhh[.,ik1:i]; 
  {b1,t1} = logts(ww,kq); 
  if t1[1] < -1.65; goto busuna; endif; 
  tt1[i]=t1[1]; 
  bb1[i]=b1[1]; 
 i = i + 1; 
 endo; 
busuna: 
kk1 =  maxindc(abs(tt1));  
core = yhh[.,ik1:kk1]; 
  {b1,t1} = logts(core,kq); 
corein1 = kin[ik1:kk1]; 
@ ========== construct a complement set of core group =========@ 
 if ik1 == 1;  
  ccore = yhh[.,kk1+1:cols(yhh)]; 
  ccin  = kin[kk1+1:cols(yhh)]; 
 endif; 
 if ik1 > 1; 
  ccore = yhh[.,1:ik1-1]~yhh[.,kk1+1:cols(yhh)]; 
  ccin  = kin[1:ik1-1]~kin[kk1+1:cols(yhh)]; 
 endif; 
 corein2 = corein1; 
local yw; 
 
 i = 1; 
 do while i<= cols(ccore); 
   ww = core~ccore[.,i]; 
  {b1,t1} = logts(ww,kq); 
  tt1[i]=t1[1]; 
  bb1[i]=b1[1]; 
 if t1[1] > ccc;@ ccin[i]~b1[1]~t1[1];@ corein2 = corein2~ccin[i]; 
 endif; 
 i = i + 1; 
 endo;  




 cin3 = {}; 
 ii = 1; 
 i = 1; 
 do while i <= n; 
  if i ne corein2[ii]; cin3 = cin3~i; endif; 
  if i == corein2[ii]; ii = ii + 1; ii = minc(ii|rows(corein2)); endif; 
 i = i + 1; 
 endo; 




proc (1) = andrs(x); 
local t,n,x1,y1,b1,ee,a1,a2,band1,band2,jb2,jband2,kern1; 
local lam, jam,j,i,sigm,ttp,ttp1,ttp2,tt; 
 
  t  = rows(x); 
  n  = cols(x); 
  x1 = x[1:t-1,.]; 
  y1 = x[2:t,.]; 
  b1 = sumc(x1.*y1)./sumc(x1.*x1); 
  ee = y1 - x1.*b1'; 
 
  a1 = 4.*(b1.^2)./(((1-b1).^2).*((1+b1).^2)); 
  a2 = 4.*(b1.^2)./((1-b1).^4); 
 
  band1 = 1.1447.*( (a1.*t).^(1/3)); 
  band2 = 1.3221.*((a2.*t).^(1/5)); 
 
  jb2   = seqa(1,1,t-1)./band2'; 
 
  jband2 = jb2.*(1.2*pi); 
   kern1 = (  ( sin(jband2)./jband2 - cos(jband2) )./( (jb2.*pi).^2.*12 
) ).*25; 
  lam = zeros(n,n); 
  jam = zeros(n,n); 
  tt = rows(ee); 
 
  j = 1; 
  do while j <= tt-1; 
     ttp1 = (x[1:tt-j,.]'x[1+j:tt,.]).*kern1[j,.]./tt; 
     ttp  = (x[1:tt-j,.]'x[1+j:tt,.])'.*kern1[j,.]./tt; 
     lam = lam + ttp + ttp1; 
  j = j + 1; 
  endo; 
 
    sigm = x'x./tt; 




proc (2) = logts(hht,p); 
local rht,trd,xx,b,re,lhht,t; 
 t = rows(hht); 
 hht = hht./meanc(hht'); 
 hht = (hht - 1).*(hht-1); 
 hht = meanc(hht'); 
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 lhht = hht[1]./hht; 
 lhht = ln(lhht); 
 rht = lhht[p+1:t]; 
 trd = ln(seqa(1,1,t)); 
 trd = trd[p+1:t]; 
 rht = rht - 2*ln(trd); 
 
 xx = trd~ones(rows(trd),1); 
 b = invpd(xx'xx)*xx'rht; 
 re = rht - xx*b; 
 re = re - meanc(re); 
 re = andrs(re); 
 re = diag(invpd(xx'xx)).*re; 
 re = sqrt(re); 
 re = b./re; 
retp(b,re); 
endp; 
 
 
